“YOU CAN’T WEAR THAT TO VOTE”:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS PROHIBITING THE
WEARING OF POLITICAL MESSAGE BUTTONS AT POLLING PLACES
KIMBERLY J. TUCKER
INTRODUCTION
As I stepped into the polling place to vote during the highly contested 2004
Presidential election day, a Virginia election official told me I had to take off my “John
Kerry for President” button in order to vote. I responded “that is not a law.” When the
official protested, I said, “show me the law," and she brought over a book of rules.
Virginia law states that it is unlawful for “any . . . voter . . .in the room . . .to. . . exhibit
any ballot, ticket, or other campaign material to any person.”1 I told the official that
whether I must take off my button is a question of interpretation of the phrase “other
campaign material.”2 I said that wearing a button to the poll is a silent expression of
speech protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. I also
said that allowing an individual voter to wear a political message button to the polls was
not the type of illegal campaigning intended to be prohibited by the statute. She
threatened to call the police. I said this was not necessary and questioned whether, if I
had worn a John Kerry t-shirt, I would have to take it off and vote in my bra. She
responded that I would be required to go into the bathroom and turn the shirt around. She
again threatened to call the police. Finally, I acquiesced to her demands to avoid going to
jail, but I added that what she was asking was unconstitutional. I propose that requiring a
voter to remove a political message button in order to vote should be considered to be
unconstitutional. I will argue that state election laws prohibiting the wearing of campaign
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buttons to polling places on election day3 violate First Amendment guarantees of freedom
of speech. I will argue that, using a strict scrutiny analysis, states cannot demonstrate a
“compelling state interest” in prohibiting the wearing of political message buttons in the
polling place. I will also argue that these laws are overbroad and that the statutory
language in many states permits arbitrary enforcement. Political speech is the most
important and highly protected form of speech and must be regulated carefully. A voter’s
right to demonstrate a political preference on election day outweighs the state interest in
prohibiting voter fraud and intimidation. Therefore, an individual voter should not be
prohibited from wearing a political message button to polling places on election day.
I. Overview of state laws
A. 50 states and the District of Columbia regulate activities and in around
polling places on election day
Every state and the District of Columbia regulate the election process.4 It is a
state’s prerogative to regulate elections as long as the elections are conducted in a fair
manner.5 The permissible and impermissible activities in and around polling places vary
greatly from state to state.6 However, the goal of every state in regulating elections
should be to prevent voter fraud and intimidation.7 Through plain statutory language,
some state laws explicitly prohibit certain activities in and around polling places. Other
3

Ten states have regulations explicitly prohibiting the wearing of buttons to the polls – Delaware, Kansas,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.
4
Because states have traditionally exercised authority over their own elections and because the
Constitution contemplates that authority, courts have long recognized that not every state election dispute
implicates federal constitutional rights. See Burton v. Georgia, 953 F.2d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 1992).
5
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .” See also, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)
(finding that state statutes regulating the electoral process have an impact on the fundamental constitutional
rights to vote and to associate politically that are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
6
The Supreme Court has recognized that states have broad powers to determine the conditions under which
the right of suffrage may be exercised. See Lassiter v. Northampton Elections Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
7
See Anderson, 460 U.S. 780 (finding that there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to
be fair and honest).
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states employ more generalized language and determine impermissible activities through
interpretation and enforcement.
1. Laws in 10 states prohibit the “wearing” of a political message button
Ten States -- Delaware,8 Kansas,9 Minnesota, 10 Montana,11 New Jersey,12 New
York,13 South Carolina,14 Tennessee,15 Texas,16 and Vermont17-- prohibit a voter from
8

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.15 § 4942 (2005) Electioneering in polling place; (a) No election officer,
challenger or any other person within the polling place or within 50 feet of the entrance to the building in
which the voting room is located shall electioneer during the conduct of the election. (d) "Electioneering"
includes . . . the wearing of any button, banner or other object referring to issues, candidates or partisan
topics . . . into the polling place or the area within 50 feet of the entrance to the building in which the voting
room is located.
9
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2430(a) (2005) Electioneering is knowingly attempting to persuade or
influence eligible voters to vote for or against a particular candidate, party or question submitted.
Electioneering includes wearing . . . labels, . . . stickers or other materials that clearly identify a candidate
in the election or clearly indicate support or opposition to a question submitted election within any polling
place on election day.
10
See MINN. STAT. § 211B.11(1) (2004) Soliciting prohibited. A person may not provide political
badges, political buttons, or other political insignia to be worn at or about the polling place on the day of a
primary or election. A political badge, political button, or other political insignia may not be worn at or
about the polling place on primary or election day.
11
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-211(2) (2005) A person may not buy, sell, give, wear, or display at or
about the polls on an Election day any badge, button, or other insignia which is designed or tends to aid or
promote the success or defeat of any candidate or ballot issue to be voted upon at the election.
12
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-19 (2005) No person shall display, sell, give or provide any political
badge, button or other insignia to be worn at or within one hundred feet of the polls or within the polling
place or room, on . . . election day.
13
See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-104 (2005) 1. While the polls are open. . . no political banner, button, poster
or placard shall be allowed in or upon the polling place or within such one hundred foot radial.
14
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-25-180 (2004) (A) It is unlawful on an election day within two hundred feet
of any entrance used by the voters to enter the polling place for a person to distribute any type of campaign
literature or place any political posters. (B) A candidate may wear within two hundred feet of the polling
place a label no larger than four and one-fourth inches by four and one-fourth inches that contains the
candidate's name and the office he is seeking. If the candidate enters the polling place, he may not display
any of this identification including, but not limited to, campaign stickers or buttons.
15
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b) (2005) (1) Within the appropriate boundary as established in
subsection (a) [100 feet from the entrances to the building in which the election is to be held], and the
building in which the polling place is located, the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign
materials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of votes for or against any person, political
party, or position on a question are prohibited. No campaign posters, signs or other campaign literature
may be displayed on or in any building in which a polling place is located. . . . (3) Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prohibit any person from wearing a button, cap, hat, pin, shirt, or other article of
clothing outside the established boundary but on the property where the polling place is located.
16
See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 61.010(a) (2005) [A] person may not wear a badge, insignia, emblem,
or other similar communicative device relating to a candidate, measure, or political party appearing on the
ballot, or to the conduct of the election, in the polling place or within 100 feet of any outside door through
which a voter may enter the building in which the polling place is located.
17
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.17 § 2508(a) (2005) The presiding officer shall insure during polling hours
that: (1) Within the building containing a polling place, no campaign literature, stickers, buttons, name
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“wearing” to the polls the same type of political message button that I wore on Election
day. State laws describe this type of political message/campaign button in language such
as “badge, “lapel,” “button,” or “pin” (all hereinafter “button”). It is important to note
that in Tennessee, the state that enacted a “campaign-free zone” law that was challenged
in the Supreme Court,18 the statute explicitly notes that a person may wear campaign
clothing only outside the legally appropriate polling place boundary.19 I want to argue
that these laws (hereinafter referred to as “button laws”) restrict political speech in
violation of First Amendment.
2. Laws in 40 states and the District of Columbia prohibit campaign
activities in and around the polls in other ways
Each of the other forty states and the District of Columbia also regulate activities
in and around its polling places on election day. These laws are designed to preclude
voter intimidation and reduce the opportunity for fraud. A group of states make it
unlawful to “display” or “exhibit” campaign material (sometimes enforced against voters
wearing buttons, t-shirts or hats) in and around polls. Several states ban “electioneering”
in polling places (the definitions of the activities that constitute electioneering vary from
state to state). The majority of states prohibit a person from “posting” or “distributing”
campaign literature and materials around the polling area. Several states simply regulate
campaigning near polls through anti-loitering statutes. All these statutes intend to
prevent active, disruptive campaigning as voters cast their ballots. A state may regulate
active campaigning in polling places because states have a compelling interest in
stamps, information on write-in candidates or other political materials are displayed, placed, handed out or
allowed to remain. . . .
18
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
19
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b)(3) (2005) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit
any person from wearing a button, cap, hat, pin, shirt, or other article of clothing outside the established
boundary but on the property where the polling place is located.”)
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prohibiting voter fraud and intimidation.20 Although these statutes do not appear to be
unconstitutional by the plain language employed, these laws could impose impermissible
content-based regulation through enforcement.
a. In 8 states a voter may not “display” or “exhibit” campaign
materials
The Virginia law under which the election official objected to my button makes it
unlawful for “any . . . voter” to “exhibit . . .campaign material” in the polling place.21
Similarly, seven other states have laws that make it unlawful to “display or exhibit”
campaign materials in the polling place– Hawaii,22 Louisiana,23 Maine,24 Oklahoma,25
Rhode Island,26 South Dakota,27 and Wyoming.28 It is important to note that Maine
prohibits the “display” of campaign materials, but expressly allows a voter to wear a
“campaign button” to the polling place. 29
b. In 14 states and the District of Columbia a voter may not
“distribute,” “circulate,” “post,” “advertise,” or “solicit”
20

See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding that Tennessee’s content-based restriction on
political speech around polling places is permissible because the regulation serves a compelling interest in a
“long-lived” tradition of state involvement with elections to prohibit voter intimidation and election fraud).
21
See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(D) (2005) It shall be unlawful for any authorized representative,
voter, or any other person in the room to . . . (ii) give, tender, or exhibit any ballot, ticket, or other
campaign material to any person.
22
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-132(d) (2004) Any voter who displays campaign material in the polling
place shall remove or cover that material before entering the polling place.
23
See LA. REV. ANN. 18:1462(A)(3) (2005) [I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . (3) to display
campaign cards, pictures, or other campaign literature of any kind or description whatsoever.
24
See ME. REV. STAT.§ 682 (2005) Certain activities are prohibited on election day. . . . 3. A person
may not display advertising material. . . . A. [I]t does not prohibit a person who is at the polls solely for the
purpose of voting from wearing a campaign button when the longest dimension of the button does not
exceed 3 inches.
25
See 26 OKL. STAT. tit. 26 § 7-108 (2004) No printed material other than that provided by the election
board shall be publicly placed or exposed.
26
See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-49 (2005) No poster, paper, circular, or other document designed or
tending to aid, injure, or defeat any candidate for public office or any political party on any question
submitted to the voters shall be distributed or displayed within the voting place
27
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-3 (2005) [N]o person may, in any polling place. . . display
campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials
28
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-26-113 (2005) [Prohibited] Electioneering too close to a polling place on
election day consists of any form of campaigning, including the display of campaign signs or distribution of
campaign literature
29
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 682 (2005).
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campaign materials
Fourteen states -- Alaska,30 Arkansas,31 Connecticut,32 Florida,33 Georgia,34
Idaho,35 Maryland,36 Massachusetts,37 Michigan,38 Mississippi,39 New Hampshire,40

30

See ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.016(a) (2005) A person commits the crime of campaign misconduct in the
third degree if during the hours the polls are open . . .the person is within 200 feet of an entrance to a
polling place, and . . . (B) circulates cards, handbills, or marked ballots, or posts political signs or posters
relating to a candidate at an election or election proposition or question.
31
See ARK.CODE ANN. § 7-1-103(a)(9) (2005) [N]o person shall hand out or distribute or offer to hand
out or distribute any campaign literature or any literature regarding any candidate or issue on the ballot,
solicit signatures on any petition, solicit contributions for any charitable or other purpose or do any
electioneering of any kind whatsoever in the building or within one hundred feet . . . on election day.
32
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-236(a) (2004) On the day of . . .election, no person shall solicit in behalf
of or in opposition to the candidacy of another or himself or in behalf of or in opposition to any question
being submitted at the election or referendum, or loiter or peddle or offer any advertising matter, ballot or
circular to another person within a radius of seventy-five feet [of the polling place].
33
See FLA. STAT. § 102.031(3)(c) (2005) No person, political committee, committee of continuous
existence, or other group or organization may solicit voters within 50 feet of the entrance to any polling
place, or polling room where the polling place is also a polling room, on the day of any election.
34
See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-414(a) (2005) No person shall solicit votes in any manner or by any
means or method, nor shall any person distribute any campaign literature, newspaper, booklet, pamphlet,
card, sign, or any other written or printed matter of any kind, nor shall any person conduct any exit poll or
public opinion poll with voters on any primary or election day: (1) Within 150 feet of the outer edge of any
building within which a polling place is established; (2) Within any polling place; or (3) Within 25 feet of
any voter standing in line to vote at any polling place
35
See IDAHO CODE § 18-2318(1) (2005) On the day of any primary, general or special election, no
person may, within a polling place, or any building in which an election is being held, or on private
property within one hundred (100) feet thereof, or on public property within three hundred (300) feet
thereof: (a) Do any electioneering; (b) Circulate cards or handbills of any kind; (c) Solicit signatures to any
kind of petition; or (d) Engage in any practice which interferes with the freedom of voters to exercise their
franchise or disrupts the administration of the polling place.
36
See MD. EL. ANN. CODE § 16-206(a) (2005) A person may not . . . (10) canvass, electioneer, or post
any campaign material in the polling place [ Electioneering boundary. -- 100 feet from the entrance and exit
of the building that are closest to that part of the building in which voting occurs].
37
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 65 (2005) [N]o other poster, card, handbill, placard, picture or
circular intended to influence the action of the voter shall be posted, exhibited, circulated or distributed in
the polling place, in the building where the polling place is located, on the walls thereof, on the premises on
which the building stands, or within one hundred and fifty feet of the building entrance door to such polling
place. . . Pasters, commonly called stickers, shall not be posted, circulated or distributed in the polling
place, in the building where the polling place is located, on the walls thereof, on the premises on which the
building stands, or within one hundred and fifty feet of the building entrance door to such polling place.
38
See MICH COMP. LAWS § 168.744 (2005) (1) A person shall not place or distribute stickers
. . . in the polling room or in a compartment connected to the polling room or within 100 feet from any
entrance to the building in which the polling place is located. . . . (3) On election day, a person shall not
post, display, or distribute in a polling place, in any hallway used by voters to enter or exit a polling place,
or within 100 feet of an entrance to a building in which a polling place is located
39
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-17-55 (2005) It is unlawful for any person to distribute or post material in
support of or in opposition to a measure within one hundred fifty (150) feet of any entrance to a polling
place where the election is held.
40
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:43(I) (2004) No person who is a candidate for office or who is
representing or working for a candidate shall distribute or post at a polling place any campaign material in
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North Carolina,41 Utah,42 Washington43 -- and the District of Columbia44 make it illegal
to “post,” “circulate,” “distribute,” “advertise,” or “solicit” political message
paraphernalia in and around polling places. These laws were written to prohibit
deliberate, active campaigning by candidates or for issues. However, these laws could be
found to violate the First Amendment if election officials in these states were to interpret
language such as “posting” or “advertising” to include a voter wearing a button.
c. 15 states prohibit “electioneering”
Fifteen states -- Arizona,45 California,46 Colorado,47 Illinois,48 Indiana,49 Iowa,50
Kentucky,51 Missouri,52 Nebraska,53 Nevada,54 New Mexico,55 North Dakota,56 Oregon,57

the form of a poster, card, handbill, placard, picture, or circular which is intended to influence the action of
the voter within the building where the election is being held.
41
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-166.4 (2005) No person or group of persons shall hinder access, harass
others, distribute campaign literature, place political advertising, solicit votes, or otherwise engage in
election-related activity in the voting place.
42
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-5012(2)(a) (2005) A person may not, within a polling place or in any
public area within 150 feet of the building where a polling place is located: (i) do any electioneering;
(ii) circulate cards or handbills of any kind . . . .
43
See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.84.510(1) (2005) On the day of any primary or general or special
election, no person may, within a polling place, or in any public area within three hundred feet of any
entrance to such polling place: (a) Suggest or persuade or attempt to suggest or persuade any voter to vote
for or against any candidate or ballot measure; (b) Circulate cards or handbills of any kind . . . .
44
See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.10(b)(1)(2)(A) (2005) No person shall canvass, electioneer, circulate petitions,
post any campaign material or engage in any activity that interferes with the orderly conduct of the election
within a polling place or within a 50-foot distance from the entrance and exit of a polling place.
45
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-411(H) (2004) [A]ny facility that is used as a polling place on election day
shall allow electioneering and other political activity outside of the seventy-five foot limit . . . in public
areas and parking lots used by voters.
46
See CAL. ELECT. CODE ANN. § 18370 (2005) No person, on election day, or at any time that a voter
may be casting a ballot, shall, within 100 feet of a polling place . . . (d) Do any electioneering.
47
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-714 (2005) No person shall do any electioneering on the day of any
election within any polling place or in any public street or room or in any public manner within one
hundred feet of any building in which polling place is located
48
See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/7-41(c) (2005) No person shall do any electioneering or soliciting of
votes on primary day within any polling place or within one hundred feet of any polling place
49
See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-3-16(b) (2005) A person who knowingly does any electioneering: (1) on
election day within: (A) the polls . . . commits a Class A misdemeanor.
50
See IOWA CODE § 39A.4(1) (2004) A person commits the crime of election misconduct in the third
degree if the person willfully commits any of the following acts: a. (1) Loitering, congregating,
electioneering, posting signs, treating voters, or soliciting votes, during the receiving of the ballots, either
on the premises of a polling place.
51
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.235(3) (2004) No person shall, on the day of any election
. . . do any electioneering at the polling place [or within 300 feet of the polling place].
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Pennsylvania,58 and Wisconsin59 -- regulate campaign activity in and around polling
places on election day by prohibiting “electioneering” in general. The definition of
“electioneering” varies greatly from state to state.
d. Laws in 3 states apply anti-loitering statutes to election day
activities
Three states -- Alabama,60 Ohio,61 and West Virginia62-- regulate campaign
activity in and around polling places on election day through anti-loitering statutes.
Although these statutes are arguably overbroad, they do not explicitly infringe on a
52

See MO. REV. STAT § 115.637 (2005) [Misdemeanors are] . . . (18) Exit polling, surveying, sampling,
electioneering, distributing election literature, posting signs or placing vehicles bearing signs with respect
to any candidate or question to be voted on at an election on election day inside the building in which a
polling place is located or within twenty-five feet of the building's outer door closest to the polling place,
or, on the part of any person.
53
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1524 (2005) No person shall do any electioneering, circulate petitions, or
perform any action that involves solicitation on election day within any polling place, any building in
which an election is being held, or two hundred feet of such polling place or building.
54
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.361 (2004) During the time a polling place voting is open for voting, a
person may not electioneer for or against any candidate, measure or political party in or within 100 feet
from the entrance to the voting area.
55
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-8-77 (2005) A. Electioneering too close to the polling place consists of any
form of campaigning on election day within one hundred feet of the building in which the polling place is
located and includes but is not limited to the display of signs, bumper stickers or distribution of campaign
literature. B. A person who commits electioneering too close to the polling place is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor.
56
See N.D. CENT. CODE, § 16.1-10-06 (2005) Electioneering on election day -- Penalty. Any person
asking, soliciting, or in any manner trying to induce or persuade, any voter on an election day to vote or
refrain from voting for any candidate or the candidates or ticket of any political party or organization, or
any measure submitted to the people, is guilty of an infraction.
57
See OR. REV. STAT. § 260.695(2) (2003) No person, within any building in which a polling place is
located . . . [or within 100 feet] shall do any electioneering, including circulating any cards or hand bills, or
soliciting signatures to any petition. . . . The electioneering need not relate to the election being conducted.
58
See 25 PENN. CON. STAT. ANN. § 3060(c) (2005) No person, when within the polling place, shall
electioneer or solicit votes for any political party, political body or candidate, nor shall any written or
printed matter be posted up within the said room
59
See WIS. STAT. § 12.03(2) (2005) No person may engage in electioneering during polling hours on any
public property on election day within 100 feet of an entrance to a building containing a polling place. This
subsection does not apply to the placement of any material on the bumper of a motor vehicle that is located
on such property on election day.
60
See ALA. CODE. § 17-7-18 (2005) Except as electors are admitted to vote . . . no person shall be
permitted within 30 feet of the polling place.
61
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3501.35 (2005) During an election . . .no person shall loiter or congregate
within the area between the polling place and the small flags of the United States placed on the
thoroughfares and walkways leading to the polling place
62
See W. VA. CODE § 3-1-37(a) (2005) [N]o person, other than the election officers and voters going to
the election room to vote and returning there from, may be or remain within three hundred feet of the
outside entrance to the building housing the polling place
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person's right to wear a political button to the polls. However, if these three states
interpret “loitering” to include the wearing of a political button, the laws could be viewed
similarly to the others discussed.
II. Prohibiting voters from wearing political message buttons at the polls may
violate the First Amendment
A. Wearing a political message button is free speech
State statutes that prohibit a voter from wearing a political message button to the
polls on election day should be considered unconstitutional because the First Amendment
guarantees freedom of speech to every American, including voters.63 Courts have
interpreted this right of “freedom of speech” to include the freedom to wear political
messages on one’s own body.64 Therefore, the wearing of a political message button to
the polls on election day is presumptively a form of free expression.65
B. Content-based regulation of speech
Laws that prohibit a voter from wearing a political message button to the polls are
content-based restrictions that should be closely scrutinized. Traditionally, political
speech has been afforded the highest level of protection.66 Furthermore, the right to vote

63

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is worth noting that the Supreme
Courts has consistently held that the right to vote is a fundamental right, which the Constitution guarantees
to all citizens. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
64
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students who
wore black arm bands to school in protest of the Vietnam War were expressing a political view through
their clothing). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the State did not have a
compelling reason for criminally prosecuting a man who wore a jacket with expressing his opposition to
the military draft through a four letter expletive (“__ the Draft”) to a courthouse).
65
See, e.g., Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 79 (Harvard
University Press, 2004 ) (arguing that the First Amendment protects the “freedom of the mind” by limiting
“the government’s power to interfere with my liberty to think as I choose, to express my thoughts to others,
and to receive their expressions in turn”).
66
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 ("discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates
are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered
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is considered to be one of the most important forms of free speech.67 Therefore, state
action that infringes upon an individual’s ability to speak must pass a higher level of
scrutiny when the regulation is content-based. Content-based laws are particularly
dangerous because such laws reduce public discourse and inhibit the ability of individuals
to express political views freely. When a law is found to be content-based and involves
protected expression, the court applies a strict scrutiny test.68 In most cases the strict
scrutiny standard is difficult for the state to overcome and the law is found to be invalid.69
1. Content-based Restrictions on Speech Impermissible
a. Schools
The Supreme Court has limited the restrictions on political speech in schools. In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, three public high school
students were suspended for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War in
violation of a school rule prohibiting the wearing of armbands.70 The Court described the
students’ actions as symbolic conduct “closely akin to pure speech”71 which should be

interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.'"); see
also Burson, 504 U.S. at 198 (the right to vote is a right at the heart of our democracy) .
67
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (finding that the right to vote is regarded as a
fundamental political right); see, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 198 (describing the right to vote as “at the heart
of our democracy”); see also, id. at 214 (Justice Kennedy concurring, describing “[v]oting” as “one of the
most fundamental and cherished liberties in our democratic system of government”).
68
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980) (holding that a content-based regulation of political
speech in a public forum is valid only if it can survive strict scrutiny).
69
See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that
national law to prevent a criminal from benefiting financially from his crime is a content-based regulation
on speech that is not narrowly tailored to advance the asserted governmental interest); See, e.g., R.A.V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that a State may restrict speech based on content in pursuit of a
compelling interest); See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (exemption of labor
picketing from ban on picketing near schools will be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis); But see, e.g.,
Burson, 504 U.S. 191 (a plurality decision upholding a Tennessee election statute that prohibited the
solicitation of votes and the dissemination of campaign materials within 100 feet of the polling place
despite finding that the law involved “core political speech” and was a “content-based regulation.); See
also, Burson, 504 U.S. at 226 (Justice Stevens dissenting, characterizing the Court's analysis as “neither
exacting nor scrutiny” and condemning the law as unconstitutional content-based regulation).
70
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
71
Id. at 505.
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accorded “comprehensive protection.”72 The Court found that display of the armbands
was a "silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or
disturbance."73 The Court examined whether the students’ expression of opinion
constituted a substantial material disruption to school activities.74 The Court found that
that there was "no evidence whatever of interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’
work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone."75
The Court observed that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”76
More recently in Chandler v. McMinnville School District,77 two students who
wore buttons that supported a teacher strike (the button said “Scabs” with a line drawn
through it to represent “no scabs”)78 challenged their suspensions for failing to remove
the buttons.79 The students argued that the school officials' reasons for requesting the
removal of the buttons violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.80
Employing the Tinker strict scrutiny test, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the protest
buttons were properly prohibited because the school officials reasonably believed that
wearing buttons would substantially disrupt, or materially interfere with, school
activities.81 The court found that the buttons expressed the personal opinion of the
students wearing them, and that the buttons were displayed in a manner commonly used
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to convey silently an idea, message, or political opinion to the community.82 In addition,
the buttons expressed a position on a local political issue and should be afforded a higher
level of protection.83 The court held that asking the students to remove the nondisruptive buttons violated their individual right of freedom of speech.84 Because the
students’ right to speak outweighed the state’s interest, the actions of the school officials
were found to be unconstitutional.85 Therefore, the court struck down the school rule as a
violation of the First Amendment.86
b. Polling Places
Campaign buttons are not the only campaign materials prohibited at the polls.
Courts have also examined whether written materials, in general, are protected in polling
rooms. In Catham v. Garva,87 a voter challenged a Texas law banning the possession of
written communications while marking a ballot at a polling place.88 Imposing a strict
scrutiny test, the court first evaluated the interests put forth by the state as justifications
for the burden imposed by its election law.89 The court then considered the strength of
those interests and the extent to which those interests made it necessary to place a burden
on the voter’s rights.90 The court found that the law imposed unnecessary restrictions on
the rights of the voter to cast a meaningful vote and to associate politically through the
vote.91 The court found that the State failed to demonstrate that banning written material
in the polling room advanced the legitimate state interest of prohibiting voter intimidation
82
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and fraud.92 Therefore, the court held the law to be an unconstitutional restriction.93
The highest courts in some states have found that wearing a campaign button to
the polling place is permissible under their state constitutions. For example, in Picray v.
Secretary of State,94 an Oregon voter appeared at a polling place wearing two political
message buttons, which the workers told him he had to remove or he would not be
allowed to vote.95 He refused to remove the buttons and was arrested and charged with
criminal trespass in the second degree in violation of an Oregon election law that
prohibited the wearing of a political badge, button or other insignia to the polls.96 The
Oregon Supreme Court found that the statute violated the Oregon Constitution97 because
it focused on the content of expression, rather than on the effect of such expression.98
Therefore, the court overturned the appellant’s conviction and held that the state law
banning political buttons was unconstitutional under the state constitution.99
2. Content based Restrictions on Speech Permissible
Although content-based regulation of political speech in schools has been found
to be impermissible, polling places are treated differently by the Supreme Court. Due to
the long tradition of free and fair elections in this county, Americans accept and
understand that some restriction on speech on election day is important. Courts and the
American public generally agree that campaign activities can and should be regulated. In
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Burson v. Freeman,100 the U. S. Supreme Court held that states may reasonably regulate
the content of speech and the extent to which someone may engage in campaign activities
in the area immediately surrounding a polling place. However, the Court has never
explicitly determined whether a state may regulate the political materials worn by a voter
in a polling place.
a. Plurality holding
In Burson, the treasurer of a city-council candidate’s campaign who had been
involved in campaign activities for many years challenged a Tennessee “campaign-free
zone” law that regulated speech around a polling place.101 The Tennessee statute
prohibited within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place “the display of campaign
posters, signs or other campaign materials, distribution of campaign materials, and
solicitation of votes for or against any person or political party or position.”102 In
reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the Court described the law as
constitutional content-based regulation.103 The plurality determined that the facially
content-based restriction on political speech would be subjected to an “exacting scrutiny”
test.104 For the regulation to survive this strict scrutiny test, Tennessee was required to
show that the restriction is “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”105 The Court held that the state interest was
compelling to protect voters from “confusion and undue influence” while casting a
ballot106 and to preserve “the integrity of the election process.”107 The Court found that
100
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the state had a compelling interest in protecting the fundamental right to “cast a ballot in
an election free from intimidation and fraud.”108
Having found that Tennessee had a compelling interest, the Burson Court next
considered whether the regulation was necessary.109 After reviewing the tradition of the
voting in the United States and the history of voter fraud, the plurality determined that
“widespread and time tested consensus” demonstrated the necessity of a campaign-free
zone law.110 Therefore, the plurality found that this is one of the “rare” cases where
content-based restrictions on political speech pass “exacting scrutiny” test.111
The Court admitted that this holding should not apply to all instances in which the
First Amendment conflicts with a state’s election process112 and that at some point
governmental regulation of vote solicitation could become impermissible.113 The Court
asserted that this decision should only apply when the challenged activity physically
interferes with electors attempting to cast their ballots.114
b. Dissent
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the campaign-free zone law was
unconstitutional115 because it was a “sweeping suppression of core political speech”.116
He agreed with the plurality that a strict scrutiny analysis was appropriate, but he
disagreed that Tennessee carried its burden to show a compelling state interest or that the
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regulation was narrowly tailored.117 Justice Stevens believed that the state’s restriction on
speech “goes too far.”118 The dissent attacked the plurality for confusing “history with
necessity,”119 and for mistaking “the traditional for indispensable.”120 The dissent rejected
the notion that the only way to the preserve secrecy in elections was by restricting
campaign activities near the polls121 and that elections were no longer as corrupt as they
were in the past.122 Justice Stevens found that Tennessee did not demonstrate that its
restrictions on political speech were “no broader than necessary to protect orderly access
to the polls”123 and should therefore be found to be a violation of the First Amendment.124
The laws prohibiting a voter from wearing a political message button should be
found to be impermissible content-based regulation unlike the campaign-free zone law at
issue in Burson. Wearing a button to the polls is more like wearing an armband (as in
Tinker) or a button supporting a strike (as in Chandler). A political message button is a
silent form of speech that should be found to be “non-disruptive” and therefore
permissible just as the Court found the items in the school cases to be permissible
expressions of speech by an individual. A campaign button is similar to a piece of
written material such as the written piece of paper at issue in Catham because it is
personal to the voter at the time and has little disruptive effect on others. Unlike the
active campaigning at issue in Burson, wearing a campaign button is a passive form of
expression that is non-disruptive. These button laws should be found to be a violation of
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the First Amendment freedom of speech because the state cannot show that it has a
compelling interest that outweighs a voter’s rights. These laws are not narrowly tailored
to the state’s interest in preventing voter intimidation or election fraud. Wearing a button
simply does not lead to voter intimidation. These laws suppress speech and should not be
able to survive the strict scrutiny test. A court should therefore find that these laws are
invalid just as the school rule was struck down in Tinker.
C. Forum Analysis
The laws regulating the wearing of buttons are not only content-based, but should
also be considered impermissible regulation of speech in a public forum. An examination
of the location and circumstances in which the speech takes place is another factor in the
First Amendment analysis of whether a voter may wear a political message to the polls
on election day. A state may be able to determine the kind of rules that are in place in
certain situations and locations.125 Use of the streets and public places is a privilege of
every citizen that is “not absolute, but relative and must be exercised in subordination to
the general comforts and convenience and in consonance with peace and good order.”126
Traditional public forums are defined as those places that "'time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.'"127 For purposes of First Amendment analysis, “traditional public
forums” are defined by the objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, by
long tradition or by government fiat, the property has been devoted to assembly and
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debate.128 Traditional public forums include locations such as parks, public streets, and
sidewalks. A designated public forum is “a place or channel of communication for use
by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the
discussion of certain subjects.”129 These forums include fairgrounds, rallies, or other
events designated for limited, special purposes.130 A content-based law that restricts
expression in either a traditional forum or designated forum will be upheld only if the
state shows that it “is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.”131 However, restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums need
only be “reasonable” and do not need to be “narrowly drawn to achieve [their] end.”132
Jurisprudence is not clear whether the interior of a polling place is a public or a nonpublic forum.
1. Public Forum
In Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme Court indicated that the area immediately
outside a polling place is a public forum. 133 However, the Supreme Court did not
determine whether the interior of a polling place is a public forum.134 The plurality
defined the area surrounding a polling place to be a “quintessential public forum.”135 As
such, the Court engaged in an “exacting scrutiny” test to determine whether the content-
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based restrictions on political speech would be constitutional.136 The Court rejected the
respondent Treasurer's argument that the 100 foot geographical regulation was not
narrowly drawn to achieve the state's compelling interest in protecting the right to vote.137
The Court noted that it is difficult to detect intimidation and fraud.138 The Court failed to
address respondent's argument that this regulation prohibits someone from driving near a
polling place with a campaign bumper sticker.139
In a concurrence, Justice Scalia described the area around polling places on
election day as a nonpublic forum.140 Although he believed the regulation to be content
based, he described it as constitutional because it is a “reasonable viewpoint neutral
regulation of a nonpublic forum”141
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens reminded the court not to “confuse sanctity
with silence.”142 He pointed out that in Mills, the Court rejected the State’s claim that
election day actions on speech were justified to protect the public from confusing "lastminute charges and countercharges and the distribution of propaganda in an effort to
influence voters.”143 In light of Mills and the fact that the campaign free zone was
determined to be “traditional” by the plurality, Justice Stevens found that the state law
could not pass the strict scrutiny standard and was invalid.144
The Supreme Court has also upheld restrictions on speech that could be
considered to be political when the state’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and
136
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welfare of the public outweighs the speaker’s rights. In Hill v. Colorado,145 anti-abortion
activists challenged a Colorado state law that made it unlawful for any person within 100
feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another
person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a
sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person.”146 The
Court determined that the law at issue regulated speech in a public forum;147 therefore,
the Court applied a strict scrutiny test.148 The Court held that even though the speech
was took place on public sidewalks, and were "quintessential" public forums for free
speech,149 the state had a compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its
citizens for which the statute was intended to serve.150 The Court considered whether the
protected First Amendment rights of the speaker to do leafleting, display signs, and make
oral communications were abridged by the protections the statute provided for the
unwilling listener.151 The dissenters argued that the Court departed from precedent by
recognizing a "right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum.”152 However, the
majority asserted that cases have repeatedly recognized the interests of unwilling listeners
in situations where "the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure.153 The Court noted that fact that the messages conveyed by
those communications may be offensive did not deprive them of constitutional
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protection.154 The regulation was described as a “minor place restriction” on
communications to unwilling listeners. The majority noted that there needs to be a
delicate balancing when pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against the
privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors -- in a variety of
contexts.155
In certain circumstances, courts have found that political speech may not be
regulated in a public forum. For example, in Irish Subcommittee v. Rhode Island Heritage
Commission,156 the court struck down a state prohibition of the display or distribution of
any political paraphernalia, including political buttons, pins, hats, and pamphlets, at a
state festival.157 The court held that the law was an impermissible content-based
restriction on public forum speech.158 The court rejected the argument that the festival or
the booths, from which the plaintiffs distributed their political paraphernalia, lacked the
status of a traditional public forum.159 The court found that allowing the government to
constrain a traditional public forum location and thereby create within it a nonpublic
forum “destroy[s] the entire concept of a public forum.”160
2. Nonpublic Forum
Courts have found that button-wearing can be restricted in non-public forums.
For example, courts have routinely found that the wearing of political buttons in
courtrooms161 and at workplaces162 can be restricted. Courts have also allowed
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restrictions on button-wearing in political gatherings designated as non-public forums.
For example, in Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, the Sixth Circuit upheld a restriction on a
button-wearer’s ability to attend a political rally.163 There, the plaintiff attempted to
attend a rally for a political candidate (President George H.W. Bush) sponsored by
defendant political committee (the Republican National Committee) that was held on
public property pursuant to a permit issued by the city.164 The plaintiff wore a campaign
button supporting the opponent (Governor Bill Clinton).165 She was allowed to attend
only after she removed the button.166 In dismissing a button-wearer's claim, the court
held that the First Amendment did not require the rally committee to include persons who
expressed discordant views.167 The court further noted that the plaintiff remained free to
express herself elsewhere.168
The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on political speech in a nonpublic
forum if the restrictions are “reasonable.” In Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes,169 an independent political candidate challenged action by a stateowned public television broadcaster that would exclude him from a candidate debate in
violation of his First Amendment freedom to speak.170 The Supreme Court found that a
televised debate among candidates for political office that was sponsored by a public
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broadcaster was a “nonpublic forum” because the debate was not an open-microphone
format.171 Instead, the broadcaster restricted eligibility for the debates to those candidates
that had objective support from the public.172 The Court determ
ined that the state action
must only pass a reasonableness test because the restrictions on speech took place in a
nonpublic forum.173 The court found that the plaintiff was excluded because he lacked
support and not because of his political views.174 Therefore, the Court held that the State
action was reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion.175
A Circuit Court first examined the issue of whether the interior of a polling place
is a nonpublic forum in Marlin v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics. 176 Appellant voter
claimed that the D.C. electoral board's enforcement of polling place regulations, which
prohibited him from wearing a campaign sticker on his t-shirt within the polling place on
election day, violated free speech protections under the First Amendment.177 When the
appellant attempted to turn-in his completed ballot during a primary election day, an
election worker informed him that he could not “cast his ballot” while wearing a sticker
in support of a mayoral candidate.178 The voter eventually arranged to cast his ballot
“curbside” (not in the polling room) while wearing the sticker on the day of the general
election.179 The D.C. Circuit Court held that the interior of the polling place was a nonpublic forum180 and therefore, the law would be examined only for reasonableness.181
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The court found that D.C.’s enforcement of the election law constituted reasonable viewpoint neutral regulation of speech because such enforcement was a reasonable means of
ensuring an orderly and peaceful voting environment, free from the threat of contention
or intimidation.182 The court reasoned that the only expressive activity was each voter's
elective choice, and that that choice was carried out privately by secret ballot in a
restricted space.183 The courtbelieved that the polling place should not be used for
general public discourse of “any sort.”184
3. Is a polling place a public or nonpublic forum?
I think a court would be misplacing its focus in attempting to define the precise
area of space at a polling place or its surroundings that does or does not constitute a
public forum.185

The entire process of voting, from approaching the location to casting

the vote, should be viewed as a public act taking place in a public forum. A voter
wearing a button or particular piece of apparel (including a t-shirt, arm band, jersey or
even a certain color) is simply providing a silent expression of a political belief or
viewpoint. If it is determined that the interior of a polling place is a nonpublic forum as
suggested by the Marlin court and by Justice Scalia’s dissent in Burson, then these laws
will only be examined for reasonableness and are likely to be upheld. If a strict scrutiny
test is applied, they are likely to be declared invalid. The choice would determine the
outcome. But public or private should not really be the issue in this situation. Voting is
one of the most important times of a participatory democracy. The basic tenets of the
182
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First Amendment should allow passive political expression throughout the process of
voting.
If the interior of a polling place were considered to be “nonpublic,” the button
laws may survive the reasonableness test. In Burson the Supreme Court determined that
a tradition of fraud at the polls allows states to have broad powers in election day
campaigning, including the regulation of individual speech. Under a reasonableness test,
a state may be able to show that a voter’s rights are not significantly burdened by having
to remove a button or cover a t-shirt for the few minutes that he or she is casting a ballot.
If the polling place is considered to be a public forum like the festival in at issue
in Rhode Island Heritage Commission, the button laws must pass the strict scrutiny test.
The characteristics of a polling place, open to all, are unlike nonpublic forums such as a
political rally as in Sistrunk or a candidate debate as in Forbes. The public forum strict
scrutiny standard is the appropriate test for whether a law violates an individual’s right to
speak. Unlike the laws at issue in Burson and Hill, these button laws do not involve
active campaigning by an individual. The state’s interests do not outweigh the
individual’s more significant interest in speaking freely.
Perhaps a state could demonstrate a compelling interest in the distribution or
political materials in the polling room if it could show that this activity interferes with or
threatens the security of other voters as they cast ballots. However, a state does not have
a compelling interest in preventing voters from merely wearing campaign materials to the
polling place because such silent speech does not have the harmful effects that active
campaigning could have on a voter’s right to be free from interference. The state cannot
show that a button law is similar to the law at issue in Hill, because there the state had a
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compelling interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the public by allowing
access to medical treatment facilities. In that case, the state’s interest outweighed
minimal burdens on speech in a public forum. These buttons laws are different because
the state statutes significantly burden an individual’s right to speak in a silent, expressive
manner that does not have an improper, significant or deleterious effect on other people
casting their votes.
III. The 10 State laws that prohibit a voter from wearing a political message button
to a polling place on election day do not pass the higher scrutiny standard
A. There is no valid “compelling” state interest in banning political message
buttons; the laws are not “narrowly tailored” to asserted state interests
Ten states prohibit a voter from wearing a political message button to the polling
place on election day. The states that explicitly ban campaign buttons in the language of
its statute are the following: Delaware, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. Courts should examine these
button laws through a strict scrutiny analysis because they are content-based restrictions
of speech in a public forum. A state would have difficulty showing that this type of law
passes muster as a compelling interest of the state or that it is narrowly tailored to that
state interest. A state may try to show that it has an interest in prohibiting voter
intimidation and election fraud--interests found to be compelling in Burson. However,
wearing a button to the polls is not active campaigning like distributing campaign
material or verbally encouraging voters to vote a certain way on an issue or for a certain
candidate that was the type of active campaigning at issue in Burson. The current button
laws are more like the school rule invalidated by the Court in Tinker. Just as the Court
determined that children do not check their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse
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gate, voters do not check their First Amendment rights at the polling room door. Political
message buttons are similar to black armbands because buttons are a nondisruptive, silent
form of speech. The First Amendment was not written in order to silence nondisruptive
speech. In Catham, the District Court even allowed a voter to take printed materials into
the polling room. A political message button is a piece of printed material intended to be
kept in the possession of voter. There is a significant difference between the action of
wearing a political message button on the body of a person and distributing buttons or
other material to voters.
As discussed above, the interior of a polling place should be considered a public
forum within the meaning of the law. A polling place is not closed off like a political
rally such as in Sistrunk or like the candidate debate in Forbes. Although the polling
place may be considered to be a profound and reflective place, it is a place for the
culmination of discourse and debate that is the act of voting. In my experience voting, it
has been a verbally silent room too. Essentially debate is engaged in through the act of
voting. I would argue that the very act of voting itself is an act of speaking publicly.
Because speech is “at the heart of democracy,”186 it is important to allow speech at the
very time one engages in that democratic process.
The Supreme Court has found that “preserving the integrity of electoral process,
preventing corruption,” and sustaining “the active, alert responsibility of the individual
citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government” are interests of the highest
importance.187 Included in the integrity of this process is the freedom to engage in debate
about the issues that are important and who should represent us as citizens. Courts
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should not place barriers of the ability of a voter to speak. Wearing a button is not
electioneering, intimidation, or committing fraud. It is merely showing who the wearer
individually and personally supports for political office. It is merely “showing your
colors.” Some might argue that this action might have some influence on other voters,
but this is not improper in a free society. Despite efforts by states to justify wide ranging
prohibitions on electioneering,188 voter fraud and intimidation are not the type of ills that
occur when a voter is merely wearing a political message button. A button worn during
the brief period that a voter is actually in the polling place should not be viewed as
intimating or coercing other voters.
A statute regulating political speech in a public forum is subject to strict scrutiny;
it cannot survive constitutional muster unless the state demonstrates that it is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.189
B. The language of button laws are overbroad and lead to arbitrary
enforcement
Internet websites and “blogs” contain firsthand accounts from voters across the
country who were required to remove buttons before voting in the 2004 Presidential
Election. A voter in Orangeburg, South Carolina was asked to remove his pro-President
Bush button in the polling area.190 The South Carolina Election Committee interprets the
188
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http://wec.textamerica.com/?=1602741 (Posted November 2, 2004, Last visited November 10, 2005).
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South Carolina election law prohibiting “distribution of campaign literature”191 as
including the wearing of buttons and pins.192 Voters in Virginia had very different
voting experiences as demonstrated by my personal experience being denied the right to
wear a button by election officials in Fairfax County, Virginia.193 Voters in Alexandria,
Virginia were also told to remove buttons in polling places.194 However, enforcement of
the law in Virginia varies county to county. A voter in Albemarle County, Virginia noted
that voters were allowed to wear buttons and T-shirts to the polls in that county.195 The
Albemarle County's electoral board considers wearing political paraphernalia “a matter of
free speech”196 despite the Virginia law prohibiting a voter from exhibiting campaign
material.197 An official from the Fluvanna County, Virginia Electoral Board noted that
enforcing this Virginia law is “pretty low on the list of priorities on election day.”198
However, election officials in some states believe that enforcing the button laws is a
priority.199 On the other hand, election officials in other states instruct poll workers not
to comment on a voter’s attire.200
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See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-25-180 (2004).
See Wireless Election Connection Moblog, “Remove the button, Please,”
http://wec.textamerica.com/?=1602741 (Posted November 2, 2004, Last visited November 10, 2005). (Poll
workers were told to enforce button law during 2004 Election Day).
193
See supra, Introduction (including my personal story); see also Kimberly Tucker, “Election Dress
Code: Leave Your Campaign Buttons At Home,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 6, 2005 (the op-ed
related to this paper that appeared the Sunday before election day 2005 in which I argued that the Virginia
law should be amended).
194
See id.
195
See George Loper, http://george.loper.org/~george/archives/2004/Nov/975.html
196
See id.
197
See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604 (2005).
198
See George Loper, http://george.loper.org/~george/archives/2004/Nov/975.html (county official further
noted that the election board (political in nature) is in charge until the polls open, but that neutral precinct
workers are in charge of polls on election day).
199
See Saginaw County, M.I. Electoral Board, website questions and answers page,
http://www.saginawcounty.com/clerk/questions/#elections (The Saginaw County, M.I. Electoral Board
states that “anyone wearing pins . . . endorsing a candidate or ballot issue will be asked to remove that item
upon entering the polling place.”)
200
See Alachua County Supervisor of Elections, Gainesville, FL, “Voter Bill of Rights,”
http://www.elections.co.alachua.fl.us (last visited November 10, 2005) (“Voter’s Bill of Rights” established
192
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Some voters know the law, such as Former First Lady Barbara Bush, who
removed a button supporting her son’s presidential campaign when she entered the
polling place in Texas last November.201 Other voters express surprise over the laws.
Furthermore, election officials have sometimes interpreted seemingly nonpolitical paraphernalia to be campaign material. For example, last year Texas officials
required voters to wear paper gowns over Dallas Cowboys apparel because a stadiumfinance issue was on the ballot.202 On the other hand, Denver Broncos fans were not
required to remove their sports paraphernalia when a stadium tax issue was on the ballot
in Colorado in 1998.203 These contrasting examples demonstrate widely differing views
of permissible constraints on voter attire. Any limitations on voters’ attire should be
closely scrutinized to ensure that election laws, and their application, do not infringe on
an individual’s right of expression.
CONCLUSION
Where does it end? A significant difference exists between a voter wearing a
campaign button to the polls and someone actively campaigning in a polling room. In
this time of “Blue State” and “Red State” shorthand for Democratic and Republican
leanings, could a voter wearing all blue/red to the polls be denied access to the polling
place to vote and be required to change clothes before re-entering? Would it be

by Alachua County Supervisor of Elections, Gainesville, FL including section 9: “Poll workers are
instructed not to comment on pins, buttons, T-shirts, etc. worn by a voter or to discuss the election”).
201
See Houston Independent Media, Voter comments on the 2004 Election,
http://www.houston.indymedia.org/news/2004/10/33862_comment.php (last visited November 10, 2005)
(Texas voter reported watching Mrs. Bush wearing a jeweled “W ‘04” campaign pin as she entered the
voting center, but she took it off before going near the voting machines).
202
See Toya Lynn Stewart, Cowboys fans can’t show colors at polls, The Dallas Morning News (October
19, 2004).
203
See Associated Press, Colorado official to county: Back off ban on Broncos apparel at polls, available at
http://firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=9444&SearchString=electioneering (last visited November
10, 2005).
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acceptable to wear a vintage Kennedy or Nixon button or one saying “I Like Ike”? Could
a voter wear a “support our troops” t-shirt, an armband, a Nationals baseball cap?
The wearing of political message buttons provides a silent voice of personal
conviction during one of the most important times for a democracy—the casting of votes.
States, including Virginia, should amend their election laws to limit the effects of these
restrictions on an individual’s constitutional right to speak. Next election day, I hope to
cast my ballot wearing a button expressing my political preferences without comment
from an election official. There should be no political dress code for polling places.
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